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TITLE VII AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT ACT: SHOULD PARTNERS BE PROTECTED AS
EMPLOYEES?*
I. INTRODUCTION
Partnerships are an increasingly popular and important form of
business organization in America. Total United States partnerships
in the services sector have grown from 239,000 in 1979 to 306,000
in 1983.1 From 1970 to 1980, the number of lawyers practicing as
partners in law firms increased by 106%.2 Concurrent with this
economic trend toward partnerships is another trend-an explosion
of litigation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
19671 ("ADEA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" ("Title
VII") (collectively the "Acts"). Last year almost 27,000 age discrimina-
tion complaints were filed with federal and state agencies, more than
twice the number filed in 1980.1 The plaintiffs in these actions often
are professionals who are not members of a minority group. One
study of 280 federal court cases under the ADEA found that 84%
of the plaintiffs were white males, and 59% of the cases were filed
by managerial and professional employees. 6
These two trends have raised a thorny legal question for federal
courts. When, if ever, is an individual who is a "partner" under state
law an "employee" under the ADEA and Title VII? Without a federal
definition of a "partner," the handful of courts ruling on this issue
have looked to the Uniform Partnership Act7 ("UPA") for a defini-
tion.8 The UPA, however, does not contemplate merely a single type
of partnership. At one end of the UPA spectrum is the two person
* Colleen Eck
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1987, 506 (107th ed. 1987).
2. Id. at 167.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
5. Freedberg, Forced Exits? Companies Confront Wave of Age-Discrimination Suits,
Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 37, col. 4.
6. Id. at col. 5.
7. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 1-43, 6 U.L.A. 9-544 (1969). Because there is no federal
law of partnerships, federal courts may "adopt" state law as the rule of decision. See Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); Field, Sources of Law: The Scope
of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881, 950-82 (1986); Note, Adopting State Law
as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 823 (1976).
8. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
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partnership operating under the default rules of the UPA,9 where
each partner has equal management rights and an equal share of the
partnership profits. At the other end of the UPA scale is a partner-
ship of over 500 partners organized internally as a corporation, where
major decisions are made by a board of managing partners, and a
partner's rights are determined by his place in the partnership's
managerial hierarchy. '0 Both are bona fide UPA partnerships, but
a partner's internal rights, and thus the potential for discrimination,
vary significantly within each partnership."
Part II of this Comment discusses the statutory language and
legislative history of the Acts, and examines how courts define an
employee in the independent contractor contest. Part II lays the ground-
work for defining an employee in the partnership context in three
areas: judicial philosophy, judicial tests, and the focus of judicial
inquiry.
Part III explores how courts' approaches to the independent con-
tractor cases carry over into the partnership context. This Comment
suggests that for purposes of applying the Acts, contrary to the judicial
trend, one may be both a state law "partner" and a federal law
"employee." After evaluating the current judicial application of UPA
criteria, Part III argues that a new set of criteria defining an employee
in the partnership context, based upon the remedial policy underly-
ing the Acts, should be developed from the UPA.
Part IV develops a test, based upon the UPA rules, for deciding
when a state law partner is an employee under Title VII and the ADEA.
The criteria of the Part IV test are derived by linking the UPA rules
to three areas that Congress intended the Acts to address: (1) hiring,
(2) involuntary discharge, and (3) the terms and conditions of
employment.
II. PREFACE TO THE PARTNER-EMPLOYEE ISSUE: DISTINGUISHING
EMPLOYEES FROM INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The cases distinguishing employees from independent contractors
have important implications for the partnership context. First, the
majority of circuits addressing the independent contractor cases have
relied on state common law agency principles to define an employee
under Title VII and the ADEA. 2 This judicial predisposition toward
9. The UPA rules governing a partner's rights apply only in the absence of a partnership
agreement. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHip ACT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213-14 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260-62 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 503 (1987).
11. See infra pt. III. § C.I.
12. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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the common law colors courts' analyses of the partner-employee
issue. 3 Second, in independent contractor cases the courts have
focused on mutually exclusive categories; one is either an employee
or an independent contractor. However, in a partnership, one may
be a "partner" for purposes of state law and an "employee" for
purposes of federal law, a legal possibility courts generally have ig-
nored. Finally, the majority of circuits favor using more restrictive
state common law agency criteria over an "economic realities" test
when distinguishing independent contractors from employees." For
partnerships, many of these state common law agency criteria are
inapplicable, leaving a legal vacuum that courts have struggled to
fill or failed to recognize.
A. Statutory Definitions
Title VII and the ADEA form a comprehensive body of legislation
prohibiting certain types of employment discrimination.' Title VII
defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer,"' 6
and the ADEA defines an employee as "an individual employed by
any employer."'" The Acts differ slightly in the definition of an
employer. Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in
13. See infra pt. III. § B.3.
14. See infra pt. II. § C.1.
15. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in nearly identical
language:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (Supp. III 1985).
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees,"I 8
while the ADEA requires that to be an employer, a person must employ
twenty employees.' 9 Both Acts expressly include partnerships in the
definition of a "person," leaving no doubt that a partnership qualifies
as an employer under the Acts.2"
B. Legislative History of the Definition of an Employee
1. House Report 914
House Report 914,21 which accompanied the original House ver-
sion of Title VII, 22 states that the term " 'employee' . . . [is] defined
for the purposes of the title in the manner common for [flederal
statutes." 23 Read in light of the rich history of judicial interpreta-
tions of "employee" under federal statutes, this statement is a signifi-
cant indication of congressional intent that an "economic realities"
approach, rather than common law agency principles, govern the test
for an employee under Title VII and the ADEA. 4
The "economic realities" test for defining an "employee" originated
as a means of distinguishing independent contractors from employees
protected by a variety of federal legislation. In NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court first introduced the "economic
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 Con-
gress broadened the scope of Title VII by lowering the statutorily required minimum number
of employees from twenty-five to fifteen. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1982).
21. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2391-2519.
22. House Report 914 accompanied the original House bill when it went to the Senate.
The Senate, however, completely revised the House bill and passed the revised version without
amendment or an explanatory report. There is no record of debate on the Senate revisions,
which were hammered out in an informal bipartisan conference dominated by Senators Mansfield,
Dirksen, Humphrey, and Kuchel. The House subsequently passed the revised Senate version
of the bill in its entirety; thus, no Senate-House conference report exists. See U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 3001 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC LEOISLATIVE HISTORY].
House Report 914 remains relevant for determining congressional intent concerning the
definition of an employee. Although the Senate changed many provisions of the House bill,
it retained the House definitions of employee, employer, and person in the final version of
Title VII. Compare H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), (b),
(f) (1982).
23. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2402 and in EEOC LEGISTAVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2027.
24. See Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 75, 90-94 (1984).
25. 322 U.S. Ill, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944).
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realities" standard. The Hearst Court held that common law rules
did not govern the test of who is an employee under the National
Labor Relations Act25 ("NLRA"), but rather courts must scrutinize
the underlying "economic realities" of the employment relationship
in light of the policy of the NLRA.27 The Hearst Court, however,
did not attempt to define "economic realities." 28
The Supreme Court next applied the "economic realities" stan-
dard to the Fair Labor Standards Act29 ("FLSA") in Walling v.
Portland Terminal Co.30 The Walling Court relied explicitly on Hearst
in holding that common law classifications were not of controlling
significance when defining an employee under the FLSA. 3' Later that
year, the Supreme Court applied the economic realities test to the
Social Security Act32 ("SSA") in United States v. Silk.33 In Silk, the
Court first defined the relevant factors in determining employee status
under the economic realities test as "degrees of control, opportunities
for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relation
and skill required in the claimed independent operations." 3
In 1947, in direct response to Hearst, Congress amended the NLRA
definition of an employee to exclude common law independent con-
tractors." The purpose of the amendment was to ensure that courts
would use state common law principles of agency, rather than
economic realities, to distinguish employees from independent con-
tractors under the NLRA.3 6 Congress likewise amended the Social
26. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
27. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 128-29.
28. See id. at 127-29. At the time of the Hearst decision, the NLRA did not define an
"employee," stating only that "[tihe term 'employee' shall include any employee." National
Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (1982)). The Hearst court relied on this general definition to hold that
the judicial definition of an employee should not be restricted by narrow common law classifica-
tions. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 128-29.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
30. 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
31. Id. at 150-51.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (current version).
33. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
34. Id. at 716.
35. Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982)); see infra note 36.
36. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33, reprinted in 1947 U.S.
CODE CON . SERV. 1135, 1137-39. The House Conference Report stated:
The House bill excluded from the definition of 'employee' individuals having the
status of independent contractors. Although independent contractors can in no sense
be considered to be employees, the Supreme Court in [Hearst] held that the or-
dinary tests of the law of agency could be ignored by the Board in determining whether
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Security Act to require that common law agency principles determine
employee status."
Congress, however, never amended the definition of an employee
under the FLSA, apparently acquiescing in the Walling Court's
economic realities interpretation of an employee under the FLSA.38
House Report 914's reference to "other [flederal Statutes" arguably
implies that Congress intended an economic realities test to govern
the definition of an employee under Title VII and the ADEA, because
Congress adopted the definitions of an employee, employer, and per-
son almost verbatim from the FLSA, rather than using the different
definitions found in the SSA and the NLRA. 39
2. The Lorillard v. Pons Principles of Statutory Interpretation
The Supreme Court's statutory analysis in Lorillard v. Pons"° lends
further support to the contention that an economic realities test rather
than common law agency principles should define employee status
under Title VII and the ADEA. The Lorillard Court addressed whether
the ADEA grants the right to a jury trial in private civil actions. Unlike
the FLSA, the ADEA contains no provision expressly granting a right
to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reasoned that the structure of
the ADEA, with its selective incorporation of FLSA provisions, and
Congress's use of words with a "well-known legal meaning,"
demonstrated that Congress intended to grant the right to a jury trial
under the ADEA. 1
The Lorillard Court began its analysis by noting the substantive
similarities between the FLSA and the ADEA. Section 7(b) of the
ADEA provides that violations of the ADEA generally are to be treated
as violations of the FLSA, and that the ADEA shall be enforced in
or not particular occupational groups were 'employees' within the meaning of the
Labor Act. Consequently it refused to consider the question of whether certain
categories of persons whom the Board had deemed to be 'employees' were not in
fact and in law really independent contractors.
Id. at 1138.
37. Act of June 14, 1948, Pub. L. No. 642, 62 Stat. 438, 438 (1948).
38. See supra note 24, at 93-95.
39. See id. The Equal Pay Act, part of the FLSA, provides that: "No employer . . .
shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex .... " 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1982). The FLSA defines an employee as "any individiual employed by an employer." 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (Supp. 1II 1985). An employer is defined more broadly than under Title
VII and the ADEA as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer
in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982). A "person" is defined in language
identical to Title VI and the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
40. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
41. Id. at 585.
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accordance with the "powers, remedies, and procedures," of the
FLSA. '2 Section 7(b) further states that "[alny act prohibited under
section 623 of [the ADEA, prohibiting age discrimination,] shall be
deemed to be a prohibited act under section 215 [of the FLSA]." ' 3
The Supreme Court also observed that, although their procedural
remedies differed, the substantive content, scope, and prohibitions
of Title VII and the ADEA are identical."
The Lorillard Court's statement concerning congressional intent
reinforces the implication that the definitional scopes of the FLSA,
Title VII, and the ADEA are the same. The Court stated:
Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial inter-
pretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts
a statute without change . . . . So too, where, as here, Congress adopts
a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can
be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the in-
corporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.
That presumption is particularly appropriate here since, in enacting the
ADEA, Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provi-
sions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those
provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation.,,
3. The Economic Realities Test Should Apply to Title VII and
the ADEA
In enacting Title VII and the ADEA, Congress chose a definition
of employee status identical to the FLSA definition, ' 4 knowing that
since 1947 the Supreme Court had interpreted the FLSA definition
using an economic realities test.4' Because Title VII and the ADEA
define an employee using language nearly identical to the definition
of an employee under the FLSA, a presumption should arise that
Congress intended federal courts to define employee status in accor-
dance with the economic realities test developed under the FLSA.
As the Lorillard court explained: "[w]here words are employed in
a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common
law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been
used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.'" 4
42. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
43. Id. Section 215(a)(2) declares unlawful violations of 29 U.S.C. § 206, the Equal Pay
Act. See supra note 39.
44. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
45. Id. at 580-81 (citations omitted).
46. Compare supra note 39 with supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text; infra note 51 and accompanying text.
48. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
59 (1911)) (emphasis added).
19881
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The Supreme Court's comments on the substantive provisions of
the Acts strongly imply that the remedial scopes of the FLSA, the
ADEA, and Title VII are equal. Thus, one test should define whether
an individual is protected by the Acts. Because the economic realities
test is adopted by Walling under the FLSA, the same test should apply
to Title VII and the ADEA.
C. Judicial Tests for an Employee in the Independent Contractor
Cases
A court's approach to defining an employee under the Acts is critical
because the test selected will govern the scope of the Acts. It is a
well-settled principle that courts are to construe the Acts liberally
in light of their remedial purposes. 9 Moreover, the congressional trend
is to expand coverage of the Acts.50 Therefore, the most appropriate
approach to defining an employee would be one that provides the
most expansive coverage of the Acts' remedial provisions.
Several federal courts of appeals agree that the economic realities
test governs employee status under the FLSA.1' However, two dif-
ferent tests exist for defining an employee under Title VII and the
ADEA. A majority of circuits52 reject the economic realities test under
Title VII and the ADEA in favor of the Spirides v. Reinhardt53 test.
49. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981) (Title VII);
Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983) (ADEA); Owens
v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980) (Title VII); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826,
831 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Title VII); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th
Cir. 1977) (Title VII); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972) (Title VII).
50. In addition to lowering the statutory minimum number of employees, see supra note
18, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act eliminated the statutory exemption for educa-
tional institutions, and Congress rejected a proposed amendment to exempt doctors and surgeons
from Title VII coverage. See sources cited infra note 81.
51. See, e.g., Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir.
1985); Donovan v. Dialamerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 136, 1382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 919 (1985); Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984); Doty
v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1984); Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency,
704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983); Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299-300
(5th Cir. 1975).
52. See, e.g., Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (Title VII); Garrett
v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1983) (ADEA); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg.
Co., 731 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (ADEA); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41
(11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982) (Title VII); Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
657 F.2d 909, 915 n.8 (7th Cir. 1981) (Title VII), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002
(1982); Lutcher v. Musician's Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (Title VII);
Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Title VII).
53. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Circuits adopting the narrower Spirides test rely on
the absence of a statement in Title VII's or the ADEA's legislative history comparable to Senator
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The Spirides test, although using the term "economic realities," ac-
tually is based on state common law agency principles.5 ' Only the
Sixth Circuit uses an economic realities test under Title VII, the ADEA,
and the FLSA."
1. The Majority Approach: Common Law Agency Principles
The Spirides test for determining employee status under Title VII
of the ADEA is as follows:
[Dietermination of whether an individual is an employee or an indepen-
dent contractor for purposes of the Act involves . . .analysis of the
"economic realities" of the work relationship. This test calls for applica-
tion of general principles of the law of agency to undisputed or established
facts. Consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the work rela-
tionship is essential, and no one factor is determinative. Nevertheless, the
extent of the employer's right to control the "means and manner" of the
worker's performance is the most important factor to review here, as it
is at common law and in the context of several other federal statutes....
Additional matters of fact that an agency or reviewing court must con-
sider include, among others, (1) the kind of occupation, with reference
to whether the work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor
or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individual in ques-
tion furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length
of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of pay-
ment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work
relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both parties, with or without
notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether
the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer"; (9) whether
the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the "employer"
pays social security taxes; and (I1) the intention of the parties.' 6
Although the Spirides court purported to adopt an "economic
realities" test, the test and the court's footnoted authority reveal that
the Spirides court actually adopted a state common law "right to
control" test." The Spirides court expressly relied on the Restate-
Black's comment that the definition of an employee under the FLSA was intended to be the
"broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act." 81 CONG. REC. 7657 (state-
ment of Sen. Black); see, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d at 37; Cobb, 673 F.2d at 340. In-
evitably, courts following the Spirides test conclude that there is no indication in Title VII's
or the ADEA's legislative history that Congress intended the definition of employee to have
anything other than its common law meaning. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d at 37;
Cobb, 673 F.2d at 340-41; Unger, 657 F.2d at 915 n.8; Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410
F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1076 (1979).
54. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
55. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983), discussed infra pt. II. § C.2.
56. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
57. The quotation in text accompanying note 56 uses language almost identical to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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ment (Second) of Agency's definitions of a servant (employee) and
an independent contractor.58 Moreover, the cases cited in support
of the Spirides test arose under the NLRA rather than the FLSA,
and arose after the 1947 amendment requiring the courts to use com-
mon law agency principles to define an employee for purposes of
the NLRA."9 Although the Spirides test includes multiple factors, the
predominance of the right to control element ensures that the judicial
inquiry will focus on the state common law element of employer con-
trol rather than the purposes of Title VII and the ADEA.
2. The Minority Approach: "Economic Realities"
The minority approach of the Sixth Circuit in Armbruster v.
Quinn,60 applies the economic realities test to Title VII and the ADEA.
The Armbruster court reasoned that the definition of an employee
under Title VII should be construed at least as broadly as the provi-
sions of its predecessor, the FLSA, to carry out the anti-employment
discrimination goals of Title VII. 6' The Sixth Circuit declined to define
an employee under Title VII according to state common law agency
principles because, unlike the congressional amendment to the NLRA,
Congress had not adopted a common law definition of an employee
for Title VII.6
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Spirides test because the
Spirides court relied on interpretations of the NLRA subsequent to
the 1947 amendment restricting the definition of an employee to state
common law principles.6 3 The court, in light of the history and pur-
poses of Title VII, dismissed the notion that one senator's comments 6"
on the FLSA definition of an employee were dispositive grounds for
limiting the Title VII standard. 65
58. See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32, n.26 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 2),
n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 220(2)).
59. See id. at 831, nn.22-25 (citing Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972); Frito-Lay, Inc.
v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1967); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub. nom. 381 U.S. 903 (1965); United Ins. Co. of Am. v. NLRB,
304 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1962).
60. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
61. Id. at 1340-41.
62. Id. at 1341.
63. Id. at 1341 n.7. The Armbruster court stated that the 1947 NLRA amendment "makes
interpretation of the NLRA subsequent to the amendment not instructive on interpretation
of Title VII which contains no such restrictive language." Id.
64. See supra note 53.
65. Armbruster, at 1341 n.8. The Armbruster court refused to "accept a judicial limita-
tion upon the coverage of Title VII based upon the lack of a definitive statement by a single
legislator, no matter how influential, especially in view of the other indicia we have noted
as to comprehensiveness of Title VII's coverage." Id.
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3. Evaluating the Majority and Minority Approaches
By emphasizing an employer's right to control the physical con-
duct of its employee, the Spirides test ensures that the coverage of
Title VII and the ADEA is not as broad as the coverage provided
by an economic realities test. Four of the elements of the economic
realities test-opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities,
permanency of relation, and skill required in, the claimed indepen-
dent operation-encompass in a more generalized way many of the
factors considered under the Spirides riglt to control test." The key
distinction between the two approaches lies in their emphasis, or lack
thereof, on the "control" element.
Under the Spirides test, the employer's right to control the "man-
ner and means" of work is of paramount importance. 7 The economic
realities test views the employer's degree of control as one of five
unweighted elements. 6 An individual who qualifies as an employee
under the economic realities test conceivably could fail to satisfy the
more stringent "right to control" element under the Spirides test.
However, because the other elements of the "economic realities" test
are essentially equivalent to the other Spirides factors, any individual
satisfying the Spirides test also would qualify as an employee under
an economic realities analysis.
The common law definition of an employee evolved as a means
of limiting an employer's vicarious liability for the torts of its
employees." Courts reasoned that it would be unfair to hold an
employer liable for an employee's torts unless the employer had the
right to control, and thus prevent, tortious physical conduct by the
employee.'I The rationale behind the right to control element at com-
mon law is simply irrelevant and inapplicable to Title VII and the
ADEA. The purpose of Title VII and the ADEA is to eliminate "ar-
tificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers" of discrimination in the
employment structure." One who lacks the means to control the
physical conduct of another in an employment setting may still engage
in discriminatory practices in contravention of the Acts' express pur-
poses, a problem made even more evident in the partnership setting.
66. Compare the factors quoted in text with the eleven Spirides additional factors quoted
supra text accompanying note 56.
67. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947).
69. See Dowd, supra note 24, at 96-102.
70. See, e.g., Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 489 (1857); Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass.
(3 Gray) 349, 366 (1855); Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48, 54 (1851), discussed in Dowd, supra
note 24, at 99-100.
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III. PARTNERS AS EMPLOYEES UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
Whether an individual who is a partner under state law72 qualifies
as an employee under Title VII or the ADEA arises in two different
contexts. First, because courts have interpreted the Acts as excluding
partners 3 when determining the minimum number of employees
necessary for an entity to qualify as an "employer," ' a partnership
may lack the requisite number of "employees." Thus, an employment
discrimination claim by an undisputed employee may be dismissed
for lack of federal question jurisdiction. Second, employment
discrimination claims brought by partners again raise the issue of
whether the partner qualifies as a protected "employee." By virtue
of the Acts' circular definitions of an employee and employer, 5 courts
do not distinguish between these different factual situations when
deciding the issue.
A. The Rationale for Excluding Partners
The statutory language of Title VII and the ADEA is ambiguous
about whether a partner is an "employee," 76 and the relevant legislative
history is unhelpful." In the absence of clear congressional intent,
federal courts have read the Acts as excluding partners from the Acts'
coverage" on the ground that a bona fide partner's state law status
as an owner and manager of the business precludes federal employee
status."
71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
72. Partnerships are governed by state statute or, in the absence of a statute, by common
law. The UPA codified, with some exceptions, the common law of partnerships. A. BROMBERO,
CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 13-14 (1968). Currently, all state except Louisiana
have adopted the UPA with local variations. 6 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1986).
73. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
76. Partners, however, are included in the definition of an employer. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
78. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 263-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503
(1987); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). Contra Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998,
1005 (D. Del. 1985) (failure to include partnerships among exemptions to Title VII manifests
congressional intent to include partners).
79. See, e.g., Holland v. Ernst & Whinney, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,653 at 34,950
(N.D. Ala. 1984) ("Plaintiff was neither an employee nor an applicant for employment. He
was the employer. He was a partner .... "); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th
Cir. 1977) ("[W]e do not see how partners can be regarded as employees rather than as employers
who own and manage the operation of the business." (footnote omitted)). But see Caruso
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[P]laintiff qualifies
as an employee, rather than a [traditional] partner.").
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The mere title of partner, however, will not automatically warrant
excluding an individual from the protection of the Acts. The alleged
partner must have the substantive characteristics, not merely the label,
of a bona fide partner.8 0 Also, employment in a profession will not
necessarily preclude coverage of the Acts because Congress intended
to eliminate job discrimination in professional fields, such as law and
medicine, as well as in nonprofessional jobs.8'
B. Judicial Attempts to Distinguish Partners from Employees
1. Setting the Stage: Hishon v. King & Spalding
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 2 an employee (associate attorney)
of a law partnership was denied admission to the partnership allegedly
for discriminatory reasons. The Supreme Court addressed whether
consideration for partner status was a term or condition of the
associate's employment with the partnership. Reasoning that "[o]nce
a contractual relationship of employment is established, the provi-
sions of Title VII attach and govern," 3 the Hishon Court held that
consideration for partnership status was a term, condition, or privilege
of the associate's employment contract within the scope of Title VII.84
80. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80-81 (1984); cf. Whittlesey v. Union
Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726 (2d Cir. 1984) (determination of exempt "bona fide ex-
ecutive" employee under the ADEA); EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d
1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983) (determination of independent
contractor or employee under the ADEA).
81. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); EEOC v.
Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 179-80 (N.D. Il. 1975). Congressional intent to protect
professional employees is borne out in the legislative history of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act, where Congress rejected a proposed amendment to exclude physicians and surgeons
from Title VII. In speaking against the amendment, Senator Javits stated:
One of the things that those discriminated against have resented the most is that
they are relegated to the position of the sawers of wood and the drawers of water;
that only the blue-collar jobs and ditchdigging jobs are reserved for them; and that
though they built America, and certainly helped build it enormously in the days
of its basic construction, they cannot ascend the higher rungs in professional and
other life.
Yet, this amendment would go back beyond decades of struggle and of injustice,
and reinstate the possibility of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, color,
sex, religion-just confined to physicians or surgeons, one of the highest rungs of
the ladder that any member of a minority could attain-and thus lock in and fortify
the idea that being a doctor or surgeon is just too good for members of a minority,
and that they have to be subject to discrimination in respect of it, and the Federal
law will not protect them.
118 CONG. REc. 3798, 3802 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits).
82. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
83. Id. at 74.
84. Id. at 74-76.
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The Hishon Court did not decide whether partners were protected
as employees under Title VII because the claim was brought by a
clearly covered employee. Nevertheless, several points in the Hishon
decision are instructive on the question. First, the Hishon Court re-
jected a proposed per se rule that would exempt decisions regarding
admission to a partnership from the scope of Title VII. The Court
noted that when Congress intended to grant certain employers im-
munity from Title VII, it did so expressly." Second, in response to
King & Spalding's argument that elevation to partner involved a change
in status from employee to employer, the Sipreme Court specifically
did not preclude the possibility that a partner's relationship with the
partnership itself constitutes a "contractual relationship of employ-
ment."86 Finally, the Hishon Court held that application of Title VII
to partnership decisions did not infringe on the partners' rights of
expression and association,"7 thus removing a potential constitutional
barrier to the inclusion of partners within the definition of an
employee.
In a much quoted solitary concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated
that the Hishon decision did not extend Title VII to the management
of a law firm by its partners.8 However, Powell premised his remarks
on the assumption that substance, not labels, determined partner
status.8 9 Powell's comments also indicate that his remarks were limited
85. Id. at 78 n.l (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (1982) (exempting Indian tribes and
certain agencies of the District of Columbia); id. § 2000e(b)(2) (1982) (exempting small businesses
and bona fide private membership clubs); id. § 2000e-1 (1982) (exempting certain employees
of religious organizations)). The Hishon Court also noted that Congress initially exempted
certain employees of educational institutions but later revoked the exemption through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78 n.1l.
86. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 74. The Court stated that "[Elven if respondent is correct that
a partnership invitation is not itself an offer of employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply
and preclude discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 77.
87. Id. at 78.
88. Justice Powell commented:
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's opinion should not be
read as extending Title VII to the management of a law firm by its partners. The
reasoning of the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among part-
ners be characterized as an "employment" relationship to which Title VII would
apply. The relationship among law partners differs markedly from that between
employer and employee-including that between the partnership and its associates.
The judgmental and sensitive decisions that must be made among the partners em-
brace a wide range of subjects. The essence of the law partnership is the common
conduct of a shared enterprise. The relationship among law partners contemplates
that decisions important to the partnership normally will be made by common agree-
ment . . . or consent among the partners.
Id. at 79-80 (footnotes and citations omitted).
89. In a footnote to the passage quoted supra note 88, Justice Powell wrote: "Of course,
an employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as 'part-
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to highly integrated partnerships where each partner had significant
control over management decisions affecting the daily operation of
the business.9"
2. Judicial Criteria: The Uniform Partnership Act
Without a definitive Supreme Court ruling, lower federal courts
have struggled to determine when a state law partner is excluded from
the scope of Title VII and the ADEA. The criteria of the economic
realities and state common law tests, designed to distinguish indepen-
dent contractors from employees, are inappropriate in the partner-
ship context.9" Many of the independent contractor factors, such as
skill required, equipment furnished, place of work, and length of
time worked, are not relevant in a partnership setting because these
factors will be present whether the "paitner" is or is not an employee.
In a partnership setting, the court must determine the status of an
individual who concededly is a member of the organization. By con-
trast, when deciding whether or not an individual is an independent
contractor, the court's focus is not on the individual's status within
the organization, but rather whether the individual is a member of
that organization at all.9"
For guidance, courts generally have relied on the UPA rules to
determine partner status.93 As defined by the UPA, the primary
characteristic of a partner is his status as a co-owner of the business.9
Other relevant indicia of co-ownership include: the right to manage
and conduct the affairs of the business, sharing in profits and losses,
and personal liability for the debts of the partnership. 9
ners.' Law partnerships usually have many of the characteristics that I describe generally here."
Id. at 79 n.2.
90. In a foot note to the passage quoted supra note 88, Justice Powell stated:
These decisions concern such matters as participation in profits and other types
of compensation; work assignments; approval of commitments in bar association,
civic, or political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of new clients; questions
of conflicts of interest; retirement programs; and expansion policies. Such decisions
may affect each partner of the firm. Divisions of partnership profits, unlike
shareholders' rights to dividends, involve judgements as to each partner's contribu-
tion to the reputation and success of the firm. This is true whether the partner's
participation in profits is measured in terms of points or percentages, combinations
of salaries and points, salaries and bonuses, and possibly in other ways.
Id. at 79-80 n.3.
91. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 271-72 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
503 (1987); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 801-02 (2d Cir.
1986) (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
92. See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 801-02 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
93. See infra pt. III. § B.3.
94. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 67 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
95. See id. § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969); id. § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213-14.
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3. Judicial Application of the UPA: Burke v. Friedman and its
Progeny
Burke v. Friedman,96 a Seventh Circuit decision, was the first of
several cases to hold that a partner is not an employee under Title
VII and the ADEA.9" In Burke, an employee sued a partnership with
four partners and thirteen employees alleging discrimination under
Title VII. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal
of the action for lack of federal jurisdiction, holding that because
the four partners were not employees, the partnership did not qualify
as an employer98 under Title VII. 99 The Eleventh Circuit followed
the Burke rationale in Hishon v. King & Spalding.'° The court rea-
soned that "[t]he partnership is the appellant's employer; the part-
ners own the partnership; they are not its 'employees' under Title
Vli.,,01
The conclusory analysis of a partner's employment status in Burke
and Hishon clearly indicates a judicial perception, carried over from
the independent contractor setting, that the status of partners and
employees under federal law must be mutually exclusive. In contrast,
one New York Federal District Court held that a state law partner
can be an employee under the ADEA.' °2 In Caruso v. Peat, Mar-
96. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
97. Id. at 869. The Seventh Circuit subsequently has applied Burke in the context of a
professional corporation. In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984),
the EEOC sued a law firm organized as a professional corporation for failing to amend its
health plan to include pregnancy benefits for female employees. The Dowd court reasoned
that the shareholders of a professional corporation were analogous to partners in a partner-
ship and, under Burke, should not be counted as employees under Title VII. Id. at 1178. Because
the law firm did not employ fifteen nonshareholders, the Dowd court held that the corpora-
tion was not an employer under Title VII. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) defines an employer as a "person" who employs fifteen
or more employees.
99. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869-70. As authority for its holding, the Seventh Circuit relied
upon § 6(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act and Supreme Court cases defining a partnership
for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949);
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946). Section 6(1) of the UPA defines a partnership
as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 6(l), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
100. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982); rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
101. Hishon, 478 F.2d at 1028. Whether a partner is an employee under Title VII
was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. Hishon, 467 U.S. 69. However, the Eleventh
Circuit partially based its holding upon the voluntary association rights of partners, an argu-
ment later considered and emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court. See id. at 78.
102. Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Prior
to Caruso, the Eighth Circuit had upheld the right of the EEOC to subpeona documents,
such as the partnership agreement, that might show that individuals labeled as partners are
in fact employees. EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986).
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wick, Mitchell & Co., 03 a nonmanagement partner sued his general
partnership accounting firm for violations of the ADEA. Relying on
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., 10, the district court
in Caruso rejected a per se rule that partners under state law could
not be employees under the ADEA.11' Stating that it had found no
systematic test for distinguishing a partner from an employee for pur-
poses of the ADEA, the Caruso court defined its test as:
(1) The extent of the individual's ability to control and operate his
business; (2) The extent to which an individual's compensation is calculated
as a percentage of business profits; and (3) The extent of the individual's
employment security. '
In applying this test, the Caruso court did not abandon state law
partnership principles. The court did emphasize, however, that the
most important characteristic associated with partner status was the
alleged partner's ability to control and operate the business.' °7
103. 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
104. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986), discussed in Comment, Coming of Age in the Profes-
sional Corporation: Liability of Professional Corporations For Dismissal of Members Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1185 (1987). Hyland involved
an ADEA claim by an employee of a professional corporation who was also a shareholder.
The Second Circuit in Hyland disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Dowd
& Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984), and rejected the argument successfully made
in Dowd that shareholders of professional corporations should be treated as partners under
Title VII and the ADEA. The Hyland court stated:
The fact that certain modern partnerships and corporations are practically in-
distinguishable in structure and operation, however, is no reason for ignoring a form
of business organization freely chosen and established. Concededly, the physician
members of NHRA found that incorporation provided them with important tax
advantages and employee benefits not available in any other type of business organiza-
tion. Having made the election to incorporate, they should not now be heard to
say that their corporation is "essentially a medical partnership among co-equal
radiologists."
Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798.
The Hyland court's decision is correct because a corporate employee clearly falls within
the letter of the statutory language. The "substance over form" approach of Dowd, while
appropriate in cases seeking to include persons within the scope of remedial legislation, should
not be used to exclude persons expressly covered by Title VII and the ADEA. According to
the Supreme Court, a plaintiff's status as a shareholder, emphasized in Dowd, is irrelevant
because "there is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a proprietary and
an employment relationship." Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28,
32 (1961) (shareholders in a knitwear cooperative held to be employees under the FSLA).
105. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 147-48.
106. Id. at 149-50.
107. Id. at 148-49. But cf. UNW. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) ("manage-
ment and conduct of the partnership business"); id. § 24(3), 6 U.L.A. 324 ("right to par-
ticipate in the management").
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A recent Tenth Circuit decision, Wheeler v. Hurdman,"'8 sum-
marizes the legal problems created when a partner brings an employ-
ment discrimination claim against a partnership. In Wheeler, the plain-
tiff, a partner in a Big Eight accounting firm, alleged violations of
the FLSA, Title VII, and the ADEA, squarely posing the question
of whether the FLSA economic realities test or a state common law
test would govern the Title VII and ADEA claims.10 9 The Wheeler
court began its analysis from the premise that the economic realities
test should govern employee status under Title VII and the ADEA,III
and implied that a partner could in "economic reality" be an employee
under federal law.II However, in attempting to apply both the
economic reality and Spirides tests, the Wheeler court noted two dif-
ficulties. First, the court found that many of the factors developed
in the independent contractor setting simply were inapplicable in the
partnership context."1 2 Second, the court objected to both tests on
the grounds that the definition of a "true partner" did not encom-
pass reasonable limits:
The heart of the standard proposed to us is a theory that any individual
who is organizationally or economically dominated is an employee. In ap-
plying the domination theory to partnerships, there is an underlying assump-
tion by its proponents that a "true" general partnership operates like a
New England town meeting; that "true" general partners are not employees
because they personally control management of the business and their own
affairs within the business; that "true" general partners are not
"dominated;" they are not controlled; they enjoy equality of bargaining
power. Presumably, a "true" partner is not only heard at partnership
meetings but actually controls the result as it affects that partner.
What the EEOC and Wheeler are describing as true partners are sole
proprietors and a limited number of dominant partners nationwide.
Thus, as stated, there is no way of applying the "domination" standard
of reality urged upon us without including virtually every partnership in
the United States .... 3
Unwilling to adopt either the economic realities or state common
law test,"" the Wheeler court turned to the characteristics of part-
ners under the UPA,III and concluded that because the plaintiff was
108. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987).
109. Id. at 268-71.
110. Id. at 271 (citing Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1984) (economic realities
govern employee status under the FLSA)).
111. Id. at 271 ("We disagree with [defendant's] position that an economic realities test
is categorically inapplicable to partnerships, but we also reject the form [of the test] proposed
by [plaintiff] and the EEOC .... )
112. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
113. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 273 (footnote omitted).
114. Id. at 271-74.
115. Id. at 274-75.
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a partner under state law, she could not also be an employee for
purposes of Title VII and the ADEA." 6
C. Critique
It is undisputed that employee status under Title VII and the ADEA
is a question of federal law to be determined through consideration
of the statutory language, the legislative history, existing case law,
and the particular circumstances of the case.' 7 Nevertheless, with
the lone exception of Caruso, federal courts have applied the state
law UPA criteria in the same fashion as a state court, namely focus-
ing on the mutually exclusive characterization of the individual as
a partner or an employee. Consequently, state law status, not federal
purpose, has become the dispositive test for determining whether the
individual is excluded from the coverage of Title VII and the ADEA.
Because in nearly all cases the individual concededly is a partner for
state law purposes, the result in a Title VII/ADEA partner-employee
case has become a foregone conclusion-no federal remedy.
1. The Partner's Limited Ability to Prevent Discriminatory
Practices
A partner's rights under state law do not guarantee him protection
from discriminatory employment practices. One principal characteristic
of a partner under state law is the "right to manage and conduct"
the business of the partnership." 8 The right to manage and conduct
the business, however, is not equivalent to an ability to control the
outcome of partnership decisions. I,9 Unless modified by the partner-
ship agreement, under the UPA a partner's rights consist of the equal
right to participate in management decisions.' 20 Because ordinary
116. Id. at 275-77.
117. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983); Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027 (1 1th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984);
Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982);
Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
118. UNIF. PARTNERSHUP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969); id. § 24(3), 6 U.L.A. 324.
119. Cf. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners manage and con-
trol the business); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (most important characteristics are the partners' ability to manage and control the business).
Emphasis on degree of control necessarily leads to the difficult determination of how much
control is sufficient to create partner status. Moreover, unless a partner's vote is weighted,
his vote alone could not "control" the outcome of partnership decisions. See supra note 113
and accompanying text; infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
120. UNnF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969); id. § 24(3), 6 U.L.A. 324;
A. BROMBERG, supra note 72, at 374; see also Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 272-73
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987).
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business decisions are decided by majority rule in most partnerships,' I2
each partner acting alone will be in a minority position and unable
to protect himself from potentially discriminatory decisions of the
partnership majority. 2 '
Partners may provide in the partnership agreement that an individual
partner can veto even ordinary partnership decisions.' 23 Such a pro-
vision is unlikely, however, because the daily operation of the part-
nership would be paralyzed if unanimous agreement were required
for every business decision. The more common modification of UPA
management rights imposed by the partnership agreement is to
distribute voting rights unequally, allocating internal voting rights
to the partners as a corporation allocates voting shares, or to ap-
point "managing" partners who handle ordinary management deci-
sions. 24 Under a system of unequal voting rights, either one partner
will hold a dominant majority and the others will remain in the minor-
ity, or all partners as individuals will remain in a minority position.'25
If there are managing partners, nonmanaging partners may have little
or no control over daily partnership decisions.
2. State Law Governing Partners and the Federal Purpose
Behind Title VII and the ADEA
To the extent federal courts focus on a partner's management rights
under state law, their application of the UPA criteria leads to an
under-inclusive test for determining when a partner should be pro-
tected as an "employee" under the Acts. A partner's state law right
121. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 213-14 (1969). ("Any difference aris-
ing as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business may be decided by a ma-
jority of the partners .... ) For "extraordinary" transactions or decisions in contravention
of the partnership agreement, the UPA default rules require unanimous consent of the part-
ners unless the partners have agreed otherwise. See id. § 9(2), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969); id. § 18(b),
6 U.L.A. 213. The one exception to this rule would be a partnership of two persons, where
both partners must consent to achieve a majority.
122. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 272-73. Some examples of potentially discriminatory dec-
sions are the allocation of profits among the partners where the partnership agreement pro-
vides for profit distribution by a vote of the partners, the assignment of clients and work
loads, and opportunities for advancement in the partnership managerial hierarchy.
123. See UNIF. PARTNERsHIP ACT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) ("The rights and duties of
the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between
them, by the following rules .... ") (emphasis added).
124. A. BROMBERO, supra note 72 at 374.
125. Even if no partner individually controls a majority, a partnership with a weighted
voting system increases the potential for discrimination. In a partnership where all partners
have equal voting rights, absent a majority coalition, there is less danger of discrimination
against individual partners than under a weighted voting system giving a small group the
equivalent of a dictatorial voice.
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merely to participate in management decisions does not necessarily
reflect his ability to protect himself from discriminatory employment
practices. As one judge explained:
Although all individuals need not have an equal voice, an individual whose
voice in the management of a business is substantially less than the others
is better classified as an employee since-unlike a traditional partner-he
lacks a significant voice in the business' direction. An individual whose
opinions and business judgment are drowned out by more powerful indiv-
iduals is more susceptible to the discriminatory practices that the ADEA
and Title VII were designed to eliminate.'
Other state law criteria used by federal courts to define who is ex-
cluded as a partner similarly are unrelated to the federal policy of
preventing discrimination in the work place. A partner's capital con-
tribution is irrelevant to his management rights within the partner-
ship.'27 A partner's compensation by a fixed share in the partnership
profits ' rather than by fixed wages also is not a persuasive basis
for distinguishing partners from employees. The Acts' concern is not
with the form of compensation, but rather with the potential for
discriminatory allocation of compensation. Finally, a partner's per-
sonal liability to third party creditors outside of the partnership has
no bearing on the partner's rights within the partnership.12 9
Alternatively, as the Wheeler court found, excluding from the pro-
tection of the Acts only those partners who have an absolute ability
to protect themselves by controlling the outcome of all partnership
decisions leads to an over-inclusive test of employee status.' 30 Such
a rule would exclude only those partnerships consisting of two per-
sons who each have an equal voice in management, or which by agree-
126. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
127. Compare A. BROMBERO, supra note 72, at 366 (partners may have contributed capital
or services in different proportions) with UNII. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969)
(all partners have equal rights in the management of the business). Moreover, ownership may
coexist with an employment relationship. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.,
366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (FLSA).
128. Under the UPA, each partner is compensated solely by his equal share in the partner-
ship profits, UlmF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) (unless otherwise agreed,
partners equally share in the profits and losses of the partnership); id. § 18(f), 6 U.L.A. 213
(unless otherwise agreed, no partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership
business). When the partnership agreement calls for the partners to vote on the size of each
individual's share, the potential for discriminatory compensation exists. A partnership agree-
ment fixing the size of individual, but unequal, shares may offer greater protection depending
on whether the agreement may be amended only by unanimous consent, id. § 18(h), 6 U.L.A.
213-14, or by a lesser vote specified in the partnership agreement.
129. Id. § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership liabilities).
130. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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ment grant every partner a right to veto ordinary management deci-
sions. Partners in a three person partnership operating under the UPA
default rules, for example, would be included under the Acts (assuming
the statutory minimum number of employees were satisfied), because
on any decision one partner could be outvoted by the other two
partners.
Somewhere between these two extremes lies an appropriate test for
determining when a state law partner is an "employee" for purposes
of Title VII and the ADEA. Because forty-nine states have adopted
the UPA, albeit with local variations,' 3 the UPA is the natural start-
ing place for judicial inquiry. The UPA rules, however, must be con-
strued in light of the remedial purposes of the Acts,'32 rather than
mechanically applied to exclude all state law partners from the coverage
of Title VII and the ADEA.
IV. A PROPOSED TEST FOR DETERMINING WHEN PARTNERS SHOULD
BE PROTECTED AS EMPLOYEES UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
Rather than viewing the UPA characteristics of a partner as
dispositive, the UPA framework can be used to derive a set of
''economic realities" factors to determine when a state law partner
should be protected as an employee under Title VII and the ADEA.
To determine if a partner should be treated as an employee under
the Acts, two questions should be asked:
(1) Under the partnership agreement, may a partner be involun-
tarily expelled from the partnership?
(2) Could the partnership afford to pay the partner the value of
his partnership interest if he decides to leave?
Underlying the proposed test is a recognition of the three areas
of potential employment discrimination that Congress intended Title
VII and the ADEA to address: (1) hiring, (2) involuntary discharge,
and (3) the terms and conditions of employment.' 33 The default rules
of the UPA should serve as a reference point to determine the state
statutory protections a hypothetical "true" UPA partner would have
when faced with discrimination. If the partnership agreement alters
the actual partner's UPA rights, a court can then determine if signifi-
cant UPA protections have been removed, thus rendering the part-
ner vulnerable to discriminatory practices and warranting his inclu-
sion as an "employee" under the Acts.
131. See supra note 72.
132. See supra text accompanying note 71.




Persons invited to become partners fall into two categories:
associates who have an existing employment contract with the part-
nership and those who do not. For those employed as associates,
the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding controls. 134
Consideration for partner status is a term or condition of employ-
ment within the provisions of Title VII and the ADEA.'
On the face of the statutes, Congress clearly intended the Acts to
prohibit discrimination in the hiring of "employees." Congress did
not intend the Acts to be "business discrimination" statutes cover-
ing all individuals having any economic relationship with the part-
nership.' 36 Claims that a partnership refused to "hire" an individual
as a partner for discriminatory reasons necessarily involve drawing
the line between discrimination against employees and "discrimina-
tion" against prospective co-owners of the partnership business.1 37
In analyzing the problem of distinguishing between employee
discrimination and permitted "business discrimination" in the hir-
ing of partners, it is useful to compare the situation in which a pro-
fessional corporation contemplates hiring an employee who, under
the corporate charter, is required to become a shareholder. Under
corporate law, the individual's status as an owner of the corporation
is separate from his status as employee. 38 If the corporation refuses
to hire the individual, the Acts apply on their face, and the question
whether the Acts have been extended beyond the scope of employ-
ment discrimination to business discrimination never arises.
Under partnership law, a partner differs from an
employee/shareholder because his dual capacities as both owner and
employee merge in his legal status of partner.'39 This creates the
possibility that a court's application of the Acts would extend their
provisions beyond congressional intent. To avoid such an extension
a court should assume that the partnership had admitted the individual
as a partner, and then analyze, in the manner suggested below, whether
once admitted, the individual would have qualified as an employee.
If the individual would have been an employee under federal law,
134. 467 U.S. 69 (1984); see supra pt. III. § B.I.
135. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 503 (1987); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1983).
137. UPA § 6(1) defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit." UNWn. PAarNERsPIp ACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969)
(emphasis added).




but for the discrimination in hiring, there is much less reason to fear
that application of the Acts would inappropriately extend their pro-
visions to prohibit business discrimination.
B. Involuntary Discharge of a Partner
Once the individual joins the partnership, the partnership agree-
ment usually will define the rights and duties among the partners.'10
As a contract, the partnership agreement may form the basis for the
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA to attach, if the partnership
agreement has the characteristics of an employment relationship with
regard to one or more of the partners.
Under the UPA default rules, the involuntary expulsion of a part-
ner from the partnership requires unanimous approval by the part-
ners. I' Because no partner would vote to expel himself, a true UPA
partnership always lacks the right to "fire" a partner (expel him from
the partnership) unless the partnership can show "just cause."'4 2
Moreover, if the partnership wrongfully expels a partner without cause,
the partnership is dissolved, and the discharged partner may demand
that the partnership business be liquidated.' 3
In contrast, the costs for an employer who wrongfully exercises
the right to fire an employee drastically differ from the true UPA
partnership. At common law, employers had an absolute right to
discharge an "at will" employee without providing a reason for the
discharge.' 4 4 An employer's power to discharge its employees without
cause necessarily creates the possibility that an employee may be
140. The UPA rules governing a partner's management rights apply only if the partnership
has not defined these rights in the partnership agreement. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18,
6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
141. See id. § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 213-14 ("[NIo act in contravention of any agreement be-
tween the partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all the partners."); id. §
31(l)(d), 6 U.L.A. 376 ("Dissolution is caused ...[b]y the expulsion of any partner from
the business bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between
the partners .. ").
142. See id. § 31(l)(d), 6 U.L.A. 376 (quoted supra note 141). The courts by negative
implication read UPA § 3 1(l)(d) as denying a partnership the power to expel a partner unless
the power to expel the partner is stated expressly in the partnership agreement. See, e.g., Liechty
v. Liechty, 231 N.W.2d 729, 732 (N.D. 1975) (expulsion of partner wrongful if other partners
could not show judicial grounds for dissolution); Haynes v. Allen, 482 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1972) (power of partners to expel another partner does not ordinarily exist and must
be set forth clearly in the partnership agreement).
143. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(a)(I), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969). A wrongful expulsion
of a partner constitutes a violation of the partnership agreement, entitling an innocent expelled
partner to demand that the partnership affairs be wound up and the partnership liquidated.
See, e.g., Liechty, 213 N.W.2d at 732; see generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 72, at 426-30.
144. 53 Am. JuR. 2d, Master and Servant § 43 (1970).
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dismissed for discriminatory reasons, thereby warranting protection
under the Acts. Although this absolute employer right has been eroded
in recent years by cases recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge" 5 or breach of an implied convenant of good faith,14 6 an
employer always retains the ability to discharge the employee.', The
same analysis holds true for employees with an employment contract.
The employer generally has the right to breach the contract and
discharge the employee, although it may be liable for damages if it
acts in contravention of the employee's contractual rights.'"
Thus, a partner in a true UPA partnership has a significant pro-
tection against discriminatory discharge that an employee lacks. If
the partnership expels the partner without cause, the partner may
demand that the partnership business be liquidated.' 9 The wrongfully
discharged employee's remedy qualitatively differs. The employee may
recover damages, ' 50 or, under certain circumstances, be reinstated, ' 5'
but unlike a true UPA partner he cannot unilaterally demand that
the employer stop doing business and sell all its assets. For a true
UPA partnership, the price of expelling a partner for discriminatory
reasons-self-destruction-is prohibitively high.
If the partnership agreement modifies the default rules of the UPA,
145. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton
v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-
Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs. 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).
146. See, e.g., Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986); Koehrer
v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985); Ramos
v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). But see, e.g., Minihan v. American
Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 812 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724
P.2d 1379 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Magnan v. Anaconda Indust., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479
A.2d 781 (1984); Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 387 N.W.2d 692
(1986).
147. See, e.g., Cox v. United Technologies, Essex Group Inc., Wire and Cable Div. 240
Kan. 95, 97, 727 P.2d 456, 458 (1986) ("The employee-at-will's tort remedy [for retaliatory
discharge] .. .providels] relief, at most, of actual and punitive damages and cannot restore
the job and the other benefits of continued employment."). But cf. infra note 151.
148. See infra note 150.
149. UNIt. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(a)(I), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969); see supra note 143 and
accompanying text.
150. An employee could recover damages under several theories, including breach of con-
tract, retaliatory discharge, or breach of an implied covenant of good faith. See supra notes
145-48 and accompanying text.
151. If a collective bargaining agreement protects the employee, under the NLRA the National
Labor Relations Board may order the employer to reinstate the discharged employee if the
discharge is an unfair labor practice and a reinstatement order would effectuate the purposes
of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
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judicial scrutiny should focus on whether the partnership agreement
grants the partnership an "expulsion power." When the partnership
agreement gives the partnership the power to expel the partner without
cause, the same potential for discriminatory discharge exists as in
the employee situation. If the partnership agreement creates an "ex-
pulsion power" in favor of the partnership, a rebuttable presumption152
should arise that the partner is an employee under Title VII and the
ADEA. 15
3
Without a rebuttable presumption that partners subject to an "ex-
pulsion power" are employees, the Supreme Court's holding in Hishon
v. King & Spalding5 ' becomes emasculated. Freedom from discrimina-
tion in the selection of partners, the Hishon guarantee, is meaningless
if the partnership can immediately discharge the partner without
justification.
C. Terms and Conditions of Employment
Even if the partner cannot be expelled from the partnership without
cause, discriminatory practices in the terms and conditions of his work
as a partner may force him to leave the partnership voluntarily.
Two important "conditions" of a partner's work are his compen-
sation and opportunity for career advancement within the managerial
hierarchy of the partnership. The default rules of the UPA contemplate
that partners have equal management rights and share equally in the
partnership profits.' 5 Even a true UPA partnership, however, can-
152. The presumption that the partner is an employee may be rebutted upon a showing
that the partnership's power to expel the partner without cause is illusory. For example, the
value of the partner's interest in the partnership may be so large the partnership could not
afford to pay the partner the value of his interest, thereby preventing the partnership from
exercising its right to expel the partner. UNIF. PARTNERSHiP ACT §§ 38(1), (2)(a)(i), 6 U.L.A.
456 (1969).
153. One author has suggested that whether a partner is an employee under Title VII and
the ADEA may depend on whether the courts follow the "entity" or "associational" theory
of partnership. Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection
of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REV. 282, 286-90 (1977). Under the entity theory, the partner-
ship is a distinct legal entity, while the associational theory views the partnership as an ag-
gregate of individuals. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 72, at 18-20.
The author states that under an "associational" theory, a partner is an employer and cannot
also be an employee. Note, supra, at 287. The author's purely theoretical basis of distinction
ignores the reality of how large partnerships operate. Moreover, this proposition is flawed
conceptually because under the entity and associational theories the principle of mutual agency
among partners makes a partner simultaneously both employer (principal) and employee (agent).
See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969) ("Every partner is an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of its business. ); see generally A. BROMBERG, supra note
72, at 273-75.
154. 467 U.S. 69 (1984); see supra pt. III. § B.1.
155. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18(a), (e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
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not guarantee that a partner will not encounter subtle forms of
discrimination. For example, because ordinary management decisions
such as the allocation of work assignments and clients are determined
by majority vote, an individual partner faces potential discrimina-
tion in these areas. The UPA principle that partners are to share equally
in the partnership profits also does not necessarily guarantee freedom
from discrimination. A partner could still be discriminated against
if the majority allocated him twice the workload for the same amount
of compensation. A partner, however, may still be capable of pro-
tecting himself from these types of discrimination in the terms or
conditions of employment if the value of his partnership interest is
of sufficient magnitude.
Under the UPA, if a partner leaves the partnership voluntarily,
the partnership must pay that partner the value of his partnership
interest. '56 A partner's threat to leave the partnership could deter
discriminatory conduct if the value of his interest is so great that
the partnership could not afford to have the partner leave. The part-
ner's situation directly contrasts with the case of an employee. When
an employee voluntarily decides to resign his position, the employer
has no legal obligation to pay the employee, even if the employee
is also a shareholder.15 7
If, however, the partnership could afford to pay the value of the
partner's interest, the partner has no leverage with which to protect
himself. For these "expendable partners," a rebuttable presumption
should arise that the partner is an employee. An "expendable part-
ner" must accept his discriminatory situation or leave the partner-
ship, a position analogous to the dilemma of most employees. Because
in both cases the net effect on the individual is identical-he must
accept the discriminatory conditions or forego his livelihood-there
is good reason to extend the coverage of Title VII and the ADEA
to include these partners as protected employees under the Acts.
In cases where the partnership's ability to pay the partner the value
of his interest is closely contested, the definitive criteria should be
whether or not under the terms of the partnership agreement, the
partner retained his power under the UPA to veto "extraordinary"
156. Id. § 38(1), 6 U.L.A. 456. The UPA defines a partner's interest as "his share of
the profits and surplus" of the partnership. Id. § 26, 6 U.L.A. 349. "Surplus" usually is
represented by the capital accounts on a balance sheet. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 72, at
231. However, the value of the partner's interest may be defined by the partnership agreement.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(a), 6 U.L.A. 456 ("unless otherwise agreed").
157. State professional corporation statutes generally require the redemption of an employee's
shares only if the employee becomes "disqualified" to practice in the profession. See, e.g.,
MODEL PROFESSIONAL CORP. ACT § 10 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2714 (1981); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1509 (McKinney 1986).
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transactions.III The deterrent effect of a partner's power to veto extra-
ordinary transactions is limited, because the opportunity to vote on
such a transaction may not arise during the partner's tenure. The
veto right is, however, a partner's ultimate means of negative con-
trol over the management of the business and, therefore, is the most
significant indirect indication of the partner's ability to thwart
discriminatory practices within the partnership."'
V. CONCLUSION
In deciding whether a state law partner is an "employee" under
Title VII or the ADEA, the test proposed by this Comment is as
follows:
(1) Did the partnership agreement create an "expulsion power"
in favor of the partnership? If so, a rebuttable presumption
exists that the partner is an "employee."
(2) Assuming the partner cannot be expelled without cause, is this
an "expendable partner?" Could the partnership afford to pay
the partner the value of his partnership interest if he decides to
leave? If so, a rebuttable presumption arises that the partner
is an employee.
This test has several advantages over courts' current application
of the UPA. First, the proposed test of employee status directly links
the substance, not simply the form, of the UPA rules to the federal
purpose behind the Acts. Second, by focusing on the UPA's prac-
tical impact on instances of discriminatory conduct that Congress
intended the Acts to prohibit; hiring, discharge, and the terms and
conditions of employment; the proposed test is consistent with the
philosophy that "economic realities" should govern the scope of the
Acts. Third, the proposed test provides predictability and promotes
judicial efficiency because it is a straightforward inquiry grounded
on easily obtainable documents, (the partnership agreement and the
financial records of the partnership), rather than intangible factors
such as a partner's "degree of control" or vague concepts such as
the partner's "employment security."
Partnerships are a growing and powerful segment of our national
economy. Favored as an organizational form by many of the profes-
sions, they also represent the door to success for those individuals
with proper credentials. While these individuals climbed the academic
ladder, federal courts cloaked them in equal educational opportun-
158. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 9(2), (3), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969); id. § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 213-14.
159. In the unlikely event that the partnership agreement grants a veto power over or-
dinary decisions, the partner's absolute ability to paralyze the daily operation of the partner-
ship would prevent him from being an employee, even if under the partnership agreement
the partner was expendable. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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ity. While they worked at menial tasks to pay for their education,
federal courts sheltered them against employment discrimination. Even
up to the moment an employee (associate) knocks on the partnership
door, federal courts ensure that the partners inside listen to that knock
with an unbiased ear. The time has come for federal courts to ac-
company those individuals needful of protection inside the partner-
ship door, rather than abandoning them on the partnership doorstep.
